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This paper analyzes how trade liberalization in￿ uences the unemploy-
ment rate of workers with di⁄erent abilities. We re￿ne the Melitz (2003)
framework to account for trade unions and heterogeneous workers, who
di⁄er with respect to their abilities. Our main ￿ndings are: (i) high-
ability workers pro￿t from trade liberalization in terms of higher wages
and higher employment; (ii) the least e¢ cient workers loose their job
and switch to long-term unemployment (worker-selection e⁄ect); (iii) if a
country is endowed with a large fraction of low-skilled workers, trade lib-
eralization leads to a rise in aggregate unemployment. In this case, trade
liberalization may harm a country￿ s welfare.
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11 Introduction
The impact of trade liberalization on a country￿ s labor market situation is a
core issue in modern trade theory. For a world with homogeneous ￿rms, ho-
mogeneous workers and perfect competition on product and labor markets the
mechanisms are well-known. However, for a world with heterogeneous ￿rms,
heterogeneous workers and imperfect competition, wage and employment ef-
fects are context-speci￿c. Most prominent in the recent debate is Melitz (2003).
He focuses on heterogeneous ￿rms with varying productivities and shows that
trade liberalization reallocates workers into high productivity ￿rms, generating
a rise in the real wage. But Melitz (2003) sticks to the assumption of perfect
labor markets and disregards the issue of unemployment. The gap was ￿lled
by the incorporation of search and matching frictions (Felbermayr et al., 2011;
Helpman and Itskhoki, 2010), e¢ ciency wages (Egger and Kreickemeier, 2009;
Davis and Harrigan, 2011), and unionized labor markets (Eckel and Egger,
2009). These studies show that trade liberalization is good for the real wage.
For (un-)employment, however, the results are mixed.
A common shortcoming of these models is the assumption of homogeneous
workers. As a result, the models￿outcomes are not in line with the by now well-
established empirical ￿nding that the employment (and wage) e⁄ect of trade
liberalization is skill-speci￿c, namely that low- and high-skilled workers are af-
fected di⁄erently. Take, for instance, Wood (1995), Bazen and Cardebat (2005),
and Biscourp and Kramarz (2007), who all conclude that trade openness in-
creases the unemployment rate of low-skilled workers. By contrast, the analyses
of Bernard and Jensen (1997), Feenstra and Hanson (2003), and Verhoogen
(2008) indicate that trade liberalization implies an increasing demand for high-
skilled workers.
The contribution of this paper is to extend the Melitz-framework by allow-
ing for worker heterogeneity, namely that workers di⁄er with respect to their
abilities. In our model, trade liberalization leads to a worker-selection e⁄ect: all
￿rms demand higher worker abilities, and since the least e¢ cient workers do not
meet this increase in the quality requirement, they lose their jobs and become
(long-term) unemployed. High-ability workers pro￿t from trade liberalization
via an increase in both wages and employment. For aggregate (un-)employment
and welfare the net e⁄ect depends on the parameter constellation. In particu-
lar, if a country is endowed with a large fraction of low-skilled workers, trade
liberalization leads to a rise in aggregate unemployment. In this case, trade
liberalization may harm a country￿ s welfare.
Clearly, the analysis of the relationship between trade liberalization and skill-
speci￿c unemployment is not totally new. In particular, Larch and Lechthaler
(2011) and Helpman et al. (2010a, b) discuss this issue within the Melitz-
framework. The work by Helpman et al. (2010a, b) is the one most closely
related to our analysis. In accordance with these authors we assume that work-
ers are heterogeneous with respect to their abilities, abilities are Pareto dis-
tributed. The production technology depends on entrepreneurial productivity,
drawn from the Melitz-lottery, the number of workers and the average ability of
2the employees. Each ￿rm chooses an ability cut-o⁄, workers with abilities below
this threshold are not hired.
However, two shortcomings of the Helpman et al.-approach are noteworthy.
First, worker ability is assumed to be match-speci￿c and independently distrib-
uted. Hence, a worker￿ s ability draw for a given match does not convey any
information about his or her ability for other (future) matches. The ability of
an individual worker is unobservable, even if the worker has an ￿employment
history￿. Second, workers apply for all jobs and accept any job o⁄er, the wage
does not matter. Since workers do not know their abilities, they do not compare
a wage o⁄er with a reservation wage, thus, they do not solve any optimization
problem concerning the job search. Solely the ￿rm decides on the formation of a
match. Low-productive and thus low-wage ￿rms may thus employ high-skilled
workers. This scenario is counterintuitive and it is in contrast to the empirical
observation that individuals are only disposed to work for a ￿rm if the wage
is su¢ ciently high (see Dunne et al. 2004; Caselli, 1999; Kremer and Maskin,
1996). In our model, workers know their abilities, each worker chooses a reser-
vation wage, and he or she does not apply for jobs paying less than that. As a
result, we obtain a ￿rm-speci￿c interval of abilities. Firms with high entrepre-
neurial productivity demand workers with high abilities, they pay high wages
and thus attract high-ability workers. Firms with low entrepreneurial produc-
tivity have a low minimum quality requirement, they pay low wages and thus
do not recruit high-ability workers.
In addition to the incorporation of heterogeneous workers, we assume a
unionized labor market, wages are bargained at the ￿rm level and employment
is set by ￿rms (right-to-manage privilege). Since the members of a union di⁄er
with respect to their abilities, they di⁄er with respect to the rent of unionization.
We follow Booth (1984) and assume that the union￿ s objective is to maximize
the expected utility of the median member. As a result, the wage bargain leads
to the well-known Nash solution: the wage rate is a constant markup on the
median member￿ s fallback income. Owing to the correlation between worker
abilities and the fallback income, high-productivity ￿rms have to pay higher
wages than do low-productivity ￿rms, which is well in line with the empirical
observations (see Munch and Skaksen, 2008; Bayard and Troske, 1999). The
question of how a unionized labor market a⁄ects the labor market outcome has
also been tackled by Eckel and Egger (2009). But these authors have a di⁄er-
ent focus, they address the incentives of multinational ￿rms to invest abroad in
order to improve their positions in the bargain with local unions.
To compute the general equilibrium we make use of the well-known concepts
of wage-setting and price-setting schedules (see Layard et al., 1991). The key
assumption driving our results at the aggregate level is the speci￿cation of the
outside wage, i.e., the wage that the median member of a trade union can expect
in the economy. The outside wage is assumed to be a convex combination of the
median member￿ s ability (microeconomic variable) and the aggregate wage level
(macroeconomic variable). This approach accounts for the fact that high-skilled
workers expect higher wage rates than do low-skilled workers.
We ￿nd three main results. First, the demand for high-skilled workers in-
3creases because of trade liberalization. A reduction in variable trade costs initi-
ates an intensi￿cation of ￿rm selection and improves the average entrepreneurial
productivity in the economy. Hence, the feasible real wage increases and ￿rms
raise their labor demand. Trade unions boost their target real wage, too. But
the net e⁄ect remains positive ￿the unemployment rate falls.
Second, sharper ￿rm-selection drives out the least productive ￿rms and ￿
as a consequence of the ￿rm-speci￿c interval of abilities ￿ the least e¢ cient
workers as well. Some low-skilled workers can no longer meet the minimum
quality requirement of all active ￿rms and switch to a (long-term) unemployment
status. Clearly, the reduction in the demand for low-skilled workers increases
the unemployment rate. We call this the worker-selection e⁄ect.
Third, the (net) e⁄ect of trade liberalization on the aggregate unemployment
rate is ambiguous. If a country is endowed with a large number of low-skilled
workers and/or ￿rms demand a high minimum ability and/or the weight of the
microeconomic variable of the outside wage is low, then the destruction of low-
skilled workplaces dominates the increasing labor demand. In this case trade
liberalization may even harm a country￿ s welfare.
Our model does not allow for technology upgrading. Yeaple (2005) and Bas
(2009) develop a set-up where ￿rms discover their productivities in the Melitz-
lottery, but in addition they have the opportunity to upgrade their technologies.
These studies show that notably exporters with high productivities use the
technology upgrade and therefore increase their demand for high-skilled workers.
We suppose that the incorporation of this channel would reinforce our results.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section two, we present the set-up
of the model at the sectoral level, while the general equilibrium will be derived in
section three. In section four, we discuss the macroeconomic e⁄ects of a switch
from autarky to trade and of trade liberalization. Section ￿ve concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Set-up
Our model builds on the standard monopolistic competition model with het-
erogenous ￿rms by Melitz (2003). The economy consists of two sectors, a ￿nal
good sector produces a homogeneous good Y under perfect competition, and a
monopolistic competitive sector with M ￿rms produces a continuum of di⁄er-
entiated intermediate goods.
The production technology of the ￿nal goods producer is assumed to be a





























where P is the corresponding price index. V denotes the mass of all poten-
tially available goods M, and ￿ represents the elasticity of substitution between
4varieties (￿ > 1).1 We suppose Y to be the numØraire, which allows the nor-
malization of the price index: P ￿ 1. The demand for variety ￿ can be derived






In the intermediate goods sector there is a continuum of ex-ante homogenous
￿rms. Firms enter the di⁄erentiated sector by paying a ￿xed entry cost fe > 0
(measured in units of ￿nal goods). They observe their productivity ￿, which is
drawn from a Pareto distribution G￿ (￿) = 1￿(￿min=￿)k for ￿ ￿ ￿min = 1 and
k > 1. The lower bound of productivities is normalized to one. Our interpreta-
tion of the parameter ￿ is slightly di⁄erent to that of Melitz (2003). We prefer
the term entrepreneurial (instead of ￿rm) productivity in order to distinguish
between the quality of the management and originality of the business idea, and
a ￿rm￿ s total productivity, which also depends on the quality of the employed
workers. For an empirical study consistent with this interpretation, see Wagner
(2010).
The economy is endowed with an exogenous number of heterogeneous work-
ers L, who di⁄er in their abilities aj, j = 1;:::;L. In accordance with Help-
man et al. (2010a, b), worker abilities are drawn from a Pareto distribution
Ga (a) = 1 ￿ (amin=a)k for a ￿ amin = 1. In contrast to Helpman et al. (2010a,
b), however, abilities are not match-speci￿c and independently distributed, but
individuals are assumed to know and maintain their ability levels at any point
in time.
Consider a ￿rm i with productivity ￿i. The production technology is given
by:
qi = hi￿iai; (2)
where hi and ai represent the number of employees and the average ability of
employees, respectively. Note that the marginal product of labor arises from
the interaction between management quality and the workers￿abilities.
A ￿rm does not demand all abilities but sets a minimum quality requirement.
The minimum quality requirement is ￿rm-speci￿c, and it increases with the




i with ￿ ￿ 0: (3)
Eq. (3) represents a ￿rm￿ s technology constraint: ￿rm i does not employ workers
with abilities lower than a￿
i because their marginal product of labor is zero (or
even negative because of complementarities, see Helpman et al., 2010a, b). The
parameter ￿ denotes the sensitivity of a￿
i with respect to the entrepreneurial
productivity.
Assumption (3) is motivated by both empirical and theoretical studies.
Dunne et al. (2004), Caselli (1999), and Kremer and Maskin (1996) all show
1The technology rules out a "love of variety￿-index. This closes down the familiar channel,
in which trade increases welfare because of external scale e⁄ects (see Melitz 2003, Krugman
1980) and allows us to ￿nd new insights concerning the trade￿ welfare relationship.
5that ￿rms with a high management quality do not employ workers with low
abilities. Kremer and Maskin (1996) illustrate this result with the evolution of
economic activities. They argue that economic activity has shifted from ￿rms
such as General Motors, which use both high- and low-skilled workers, to ￿rms
such as Microsoft and McDonald￿ s, whose workers are much more homogeneous.
To put it di⁄erently, the low-productive ￿rm Mc Donald￿ s primarily demands
workers with low quali￿cation, e.g. collectors, while the high-productive ￿rm
Microsoft primarily employs high-skilled workers, e.g. computer scientists. A
prominent theoretical study on this issue is Albrecht and Vroman (2002), who
construct a matching model of the labor market that incorporates both skill
di⁄erences across workers and di⁄erences in skill requirements across jobs. In
particular, ￿rms create jobs and for each job they choose a skill requirement in
order to maximize the value of the vacancy. Helpman et al. (2010a, b) assume
that by paying a screening cost, a ￿rm can identify workers with an ability be-
low a threshold. And since a ￿rm does not employ workers with abilities less
than this threshold, they get a minimum quality requirement which is increasing
in the (entrepreneurial) productivity of the ￿rm. In a similar vein, Uren and
Virag (2011) develop a model where the required skills vary across jobs, and the
greater the productivity of the ￿rm the greater is the required skill.
The wage o⁄er matters. Just as a ￿rm might not want to hire a low-ability
worker, a worker may not want to work for a low-wage ￿rm. Individuals di⁄er
with respect to their reservation wage. The higher the ability of an individual,
the higher is the marginal product of labor, and the higher is the reservation
wage. A worker does not apply for jobs paying less than the reservation wage.
As a result, we can identify an upper bound of abilities for each ￿rm. If
￿rm i o⁄ers a wage rate wi, there will be a worker who is indi⁄erent between
(short-term) unemployment and employment in ￿rm i. We de￿ne this worker
as employee zi with ability azi and reservation wage bzi. For wi = bzi, ￿rm i
attracts workers with abilities a ￿ azi, workers with a > azi do not apply for a
job in ￿rm i. Note that a ￿rm is able to in￿ uence the upper bound of employees￿
abilities by o⁄ering a higher wage: @azi=@wi > 0.
The abilities of ￿rm i￿ s employees lie within the interval a￿
i and azi, where
the limits depend on the productivity ￿i and wage rate wi. The average ability













where @ai=@azi > 0. A wage increase swells azi and thus the average ability.
The determination of employment and wages at the sectoral level is mod-
elled as a ￿ve-stage game, which we solve by backward induction. In the ￿rst
stage, ￿rm i participates in the Melitz lottery and discovers its entrepreneurial
productivity ￿i. Given ￿i, ￿rm i decides whether to produce or not. In the case
of production, ￿rm i posts a vacancy (stage two). The job description includes
the minimum quality requirement a￿
i and a wage o⁄er wi, where we insinuate
that ￿rms anticipate correctly the outcome of the wage bargain in stage four.
6Therefore, the o⁄ered wage will be identical to the paid wage wi. Additionally,
posting a vacancy is assumed to be costless. More precisely, the advertisement
does not create variable costs.
In the third stage, workers collect information about job vacancies. Informa-
tion gathering is costless, so that all workers have perfect knowledge of all job
descriptions. If the marginal costs of applications are zero, the optimal strategy
of a worker j with ability aj is to apply for all jobs with a minimum quality
requirement a￿
i ￿ aj and a wage o⁄er no less than his or her reservation wage.
Any ￿rm i thus obtains a full distribution of abilities between the limits a￿
i and
azi. To extract an economic rent, the applicants form a trade union at the ￿rm
level. The membership of union i is denoted by ni. Note that a worker will
only apply for those vacancies s/he expects s/he will accept. Consequenly, a
worker accepts the o⁄er of any job for which s/he has applied (see Layard et.
al, 1991).
The fourth stage consists of the wage bargain between ￿rm i and union i;
both parties anticipate the employment decision of the ￿rm in stage ￿ve. After
the ￿rm has set the optimal employment level hi, it draws randomly workers
from the union members until hi is reached. Since all union members ful￿l
the minimum quality requirement and all the union members accept the job
o⁄er, there will be a ￿drawing without repetition￿ . We abstract from a (costly)
screening technology. Firms are assumed to observe the minimum ability of a
worker at no costs, but they are not able to observe the exact value of aj of
an individual worker. Furthermore, note that the existence of unions eliminates
any wage di⁄erentiation within ￿rms.
2.2 Labor demand
We begin by discussing stage ￿ve, where wi, azi, a￿
i, and ai are already deter-
mined. Pro￿ts of ￿rm i are de￿ned by ￿i = ri ￿ wihi ￿ f, where ri is real
revenue and f is the ￿xed input requirement of each intermediate good (mea-
sured in units of ￿nal goods). f can be interpreted as beachhead costs, which
also include the (￿xed) costs of vacancy posting. Each ￿rm faces a constant
elasticity demand curve (1). Thus, the ￿rm￿ s revenue ri = qipi is given by
ri = q￿




where ￿ denotes the degree of competitiveness in the market for intermediate
goods. The ￿rm maximizes pro￿ts by setting employment such that the mar-
ginal revenue of labor equals marginal costs: @ri=@hi = wi. The optimal level











with @hi=@wi < 0. Note that the number of ￿rms M and aggregate output Y







is a constant markup 1=￿ over marginal costs.
2.3 Wage bargaining and fallback income
In the fourth stage, ￿rm i and trade union i bargain over the wage rate wi, at
which the number of union members ni is already ￿xed. As shown above, union
members are heterogeneous with respect to their abilities, which lie within the
interval a￿
i and azi. The union maximizes the expected utility of the median











with bmi denoting the reservation wage (fallback income) of the median member.
By assumption, the membership ni exceeds the ￿rm￿ s labor demand hi and the
unions are risk neutral.







with ￿ (0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1) being the union￿ s bargaining power. If the bargaining fails,
employment and production fall back to zero. Consequently, the threat points
of the union and the ￿rm are given by Umi = bmi and ￿i = ￿f, respectively.
Substituting (8), the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t ￿i = ri ￿ hiwi ￿ f and the threat points
in the Nash product implies NPi = (hi (wi ￿ bmi)=ni)
￿ (ri ￿ hiwi)
1￿￿. The
solution of the optimization problem leads to a well-known result: the wage wi
is a markup ￿i over the median member￿ s fallback income:
wi = ￿ibmi with ￿i ￿
￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿ai;wi)
￿￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿ai;wi)
￿ 1: (9)
The union generates an economic surplus for its members, which we de￿ne as
the di⁄erence between the wage rate wi and the fallback income of the median
member bmi. The wage markup ￿i is increasing in the union￿ s bargaining power
and decreasing in the degree of competitiveness in the market for intermediate
goods. In the case of perfect competition (￿ ! 1), there is no economic rent,
the markup converges to unity. Moreover, the markup is increasing in the wage




higher the increase in the average ability as response to a wage hike, the better
is the trade-o⁄ between jobs and wages facing the union, and the higher is the
bargained wage (see Garino and Martin, 2000). Of course, the elasticity is
endogenous, we take up this issue in section 3.1.
We complete the analysis of stage four by the derivation of the fallback
income of worker j with ability aj. If worker j is the median member of ￿rm i,


















where ￿ represents the discount factor and ￿ denotes the probability of the
￿rm￿ s death (exogenous and independent of productivity). Therefore, ￿ can
also be interpreted as the probability of job loss for any employee. The like-
lihood that worker j will switch from unemployment to a job is captured by
ej. For analytical simplicity, we normalize the marginal utility of leisure and
the unemployment bene￿ts to zero.The fallback income is de￿ned as the period
income of an unemployed worker: bj ￿ ￿V u
j (see Layard and Nickell, 1990).
From the value functions we obtain bj =
ej
￿+￿+ejwj.
In a steady state, the ￿ ow equilibrium for any quali￿cation level must hold.
The ￿ ow equilibrium for, e.g., the ability aj requires the in￿ ow from employment
to unemployment to be equal to the out￿ ow from unemployment to employment:
￿ (1 ￿ uj) = ejuj: (10)
Entrepreneurial productivity and workers￿abilities are both Pareto distributed
with identical lower bounds and shape parameter k. These characteristics com-
bined with the assumption of a random matching imply that the ratio of em-
ployed workers with ability j, Hj; to the number of all workers with ability j,
Lj; is equal for all j. As a result, the unemployment rate is identical across all
abilities:




By using (10) and (11) the fallback income can be derived as2
bj = (1 ￿ u)wj: (12)
As already mentioned, the fallback income of worker j corresponds with the
reservation wage of worker j. The reservation wage is decreasing in the unem-
ployment rate and increasing in the outside wage wj, which is de￿ned as j￿ s
expected wage rate in the economy.
Let us have a closer look at the outside wage. The empirical literature
shows that wages are determined by both individual characteristics and a coun-
try￿ s macroeconomic performance (see, for instance, Fairris and Jonasson, 2008;
Nickell and Kong, 1992; Holmlund and Zetterberg, 1991). We take up this
observation by assuming that the outside wage is a convex combination of a
microeconomic and a macroeconomic variable:
2Note that (12) is an approximation, which holds for ￿u = 0. For a justi￿cation of this






0 ￿ ! ￿ 1: (13)
In our context, the most plausible microeconomic variable is the ability aj of
worker j. The higher the skill-level of a worker, the higher is the wage s/he
can expect in the economy (or: the computer scientist expects a higher wage
than the collector irrespective of the state of the economy). Less obvious is
the macroeconomic variable. In a world with homogeneous workers, where, by
de￿nition, individual characteristics do not matter (! = 0), consistency requires
that the outside wage coincides with the wage prevailing in a (symmetric) gen-
eral equilibrium (see, for instance, Layard and Nickell, 1990). We pick up this
scenario by assuming that the outside wage of a worker j is increasing in the
wage rate which holds in the general equilibrium, w(e ￿), where e ￿ denotes the
entrepreneurial productivity of the representative ￿rm (see below).3
With these building blocks at hand, noting j = mi, the bargained wage (9)
can be rewritten as






Owing to heterogeneous individuals, the economic surplus (bargained wage mi-
nus reservation wage) di⁄ers between union members. Within the ￿rm￿ s and
the union￿ s ability interval, the worker with the minimum quali￿cation obtains
the largest rent (lowest reservation wage). The surplus declines with members￿
ability levels, because of an increasing reservation wage. Member zi with the
highest quali￿cation has a zero surplus, which makes him or her indi⁄erent
between taking a job in ￿rm i and looking for a job elsewhere.
2.4 Unions, vacancy posting and Melitz lottery
Stage three determines union membership ni. As illustrated above, all workers
with ability a￿
i ￿ a ￿ azi apply for a job at ￿rm i, so that each ￿rm i gets the
full distribution of abilities within the two limits. Workers with an ability larger
than azi have a reservation wage exceeding wi, they do not apply, they are not
members of trade union i. The number of applicants and thus the number of









3One might argue that high-skilled workers with a reservation wage above the wage paid
by the representative ￿rm are not a⁄ected by w(e ￿). Consequently, w(e ￿) should not be part
of their outside option. However, in a Melitz-world with pareto-distributed productivities the
aggregate variables have the property that they are identical to what they would be if the
economy were endowed with M identical ￿rms with productivity e ￿. Therefore, w(e ￿) is only a
shortcut for the "true" distribution of wages in the economy. A shift in w(e ￿) should thus be
interpreted as proxy for a shift in the whole wage distribution a⁄ecting all wages irrespective
of the skill-level.
10In order to determine the ability limits we turn to the posting of the vacancy,
which is the topic of stage two, where a ￿rm￿ s entrepreneurial productivity ￿i




i . The upper limit, on the other hand, is determined
by the requirement that the posted wage equals the reservation wage of the
e¢ cient worker zi. The posted wage is given by (14), the reservation wage of





. From wi = bzi immediately
follows azi = ￿
1=!
i ami. As shown in Appendix A, the ability of the median









Inserting this result into azi = ￿
1=!
i ami and noting a￿
i = ￿
￿










If a ￿rm knows its entrepreneurial productivity ￿i, it sets a minimum ability
according to (3) and the ability of the e¢ cient worker is given by (17). Note
that the ability of the e¢ cient worker and thus the average ability is increasing
in the union￿ s bargaining power (higher wage markup ￿i). The wage rate can














The wage wi is increasing in the entrepreneurial productivity ￿i. High-productivity
￿rms have to pay higher wages than do low-productivity ￿rms, since the ability
and thus the fallback income of the median member of the corresponding trade
union is higher. The empirical literature supports this result (see, for instance,
Munch and Skaksen, 2008; Bayard and Troske, 1999).
In stage one, ￿rm i participates in the Melitz-lottery and draws the entre-
preneurial productivity ￿i. Subsequently, it has to decide whether to enter the
market and to produce or not. A ￿rm will produce if and only if the expected
stream of pro￿ts is non-negative. Two conditions must hold in the case of
production, the free entry condition and the zero cut-o⁄ pro￿t condition (see
Melitz, 2003). We follow Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) and derive from these








with ￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)(1 + ￿ ￿ ￿!) > 0 and ￿
￿ representing the lowest productivity,
which is compatible with a non-negative expected pro￿t stream of a ￿rm. For
￿i < ￿
￿, the ￿rm will not enter the market. Note that changes in the union
bargaining power ￿ have no impact on the cut-o⁄productivity ￿
￿. For a similar
result, see Eckel and Egger (2009).
11The existence of such a marginal ￿rm with productivity ￿
￿ has important
consequences for the segregation of the labor force of the economy. Analogous
to ￿rm i, the marginal ￿rm also sets a minimum quality requirement a￿. Since
no ￿rm has a lower entrepreneurial productivity, a￿ can be interpreted as the
minimum quality requirement for the whole economy. For workers with a < a￿,
their abilities are not su¢ cient to gain any job, as no active ￿rm on the market




Thus, we divide the labor force L into two groups: (i) active4 workers L with
a ￿ a￿ and u = 1 ￿ H=L < 1 and (ii) (long-term) unemployed persons Ll with
a < a￿ and ul = 1. The latter will never be members of a union because they
are not able to meet the job requirements. Consequently, unions and ￿rms only
account for active workers in the bargaining process.
3 General equilibrium
So far, we have described the model at the sectoral level. To gain insights into
the labor market e⁄ects of both trade unions and trade liberalization in the
presence of trade unions, we now derive the general equilibrium.
3.1 Average productivity and aggregation
Consider the weighted average productivity level e ￿ ￿rst. By following the step-







￿; k > ￿: (21)
The derivation of (21) makes use of the fact that the wage elasticity of average
ability, ￿ai;wi, and thus the wage markup ￿i is identical across all ￿rms: ￿ai;wi =
￿a;w and ￿i = ￿ for all i (see Appendix B).
Product market clearing requires the pro￿t-maximizing price to be P =
p(e ￿) = 1. With this at hand we calculate the aggregate variables as Y = Mq(e ￿),
R = Mr(e ￿) and ￿ = M￿(e ￿). For aggregate employment H, we obtain:







k ￿ ￿ + ￿!
: (22)
As mentioned above, we distinguish between the unemployment rate of low-
skilled workers ul and the unemployment rate of active workers u. The aggregate
(total) unemployment rate u is a weighted average of ul and u. By using the
probabilities P(a < a￿) = 1 ￿ (a￿)
￿k and P(a > a￿) = (a￿)
￿k as weights, we
4"Active" means that these workers have a positive employment probability. Nevertheless,
at each point in time a fraction of ￿active￿workers is unemployed.







that u = 1 ￿ H=L, the aggregate unemployment rate simpli￿es to




The higher the minimum quality requirement, the higher is the share of un-
employed low-skilled workers and the higher is the aggregate unemployment
rate.
The aggregate variables have an important property (see Melitz, 2003): the
aggregate levels of P, Y , R, ￿; and H are identical to what they would be if the
economy were endowed with M identical ￿rms with productivity e ￿. Therefore,
we treat the ￿rm with productivity e ￿ as the representative ￿rm of the economy.
3.2 Equilibrium unemployment, welfare and wage distri-
bution
In order to pin down the aggregate unemployment rate in the general equilib-
rium, we make use of the well-known concepts of wage-setting and price-setting
schedules (see Layard et al., 1991). Consider ￿rst aggregate price-setting behav-
ior. The representative ￿rm chooses p(e ￿) = 1. Then, the price rule (7) delivers
the feasible real wage:
wPS(e ￿) = ￿a(e ￿;￿) ￿ e ￿: (24)
The feasible real wage is independent of (un-)employment, which is no surprise
because of our assumptions on technology (output is linear in labor) and the
constant price elasticity of product demand. However, the feasible real wage
is positively a⁄ected by trade unions. More powerful trade unions increase the
wage markup ￿, which in turn increases the ability of the e¢ cient worker [see
(17)], and thus the average ability a [see (4)], and thus the feasible real wage.
Let us turn to the target real wage. The representative ￿rm bargains with
the representative union over the wage rate. The result is given by (18). Taking
the macroeconomic variables as given, the target real wage of the representative










(1 ￿ u) ￿ e ￿
￿!
: (25)
The higher the bargaining power of the union, the higher the outside wage and
the lower the unemployment rate of active workers, the higher is the target real
wage.
In the general equilibrium, we have wPS(e ￿) = wWS(e ￿) = w(e ￿). By combin-
ing (24) and (25), we can compute the unemployment rate of the active workers
as (see Appendix C):
u = 1 ￿ ￿3 ￿ e ￿
!
; (26)
13where ￿3 is a positive constant de￿ned in Appendix C. Note that the rate of
unemployment of active workers is decreasing in the average productivity e ￿ and
independent of the labor force L.5
In a next step, we derive the number of long-term unemployed, Ll. Inserting




1 ￿ ￿3 ￿ e ￿
￿￿k￿






An increase in the cut-o⁄ productivity ￿
￿, which translates into an increase in
the average productivity e ￿, leads to a rise in workers￿minimum quality require-
ment, see (20). The least e¢ cient workers are driven out of the market and
switch to long-term unemployment. This is the worker-selection e⁄ect. If the
economy is endowed with a large proportion of low-skilled workers and a large
proportion of low entrepreneurial productivities (high k), the worker-selection
e⁄ect will be strong. Similarly, the more sensitive the minimum quality require-
ment responses to a change in ￿
￿ (high ￿), the stronger is the worker-selection
e⁄ect.
The number of active workers is straightforward to derive:
L = L ￿ Ll = ￿3 ￿ e ￿
￿￿k
￿ L: (28)
The number of employed active workers H = (1 ￿ u)L is given by
H = ￿3￿3 ￿ e ￿
!￿￿k
￿ L: (29)
The employment e⁄ect of higher entrepreneurial productivity is ambiguous. We
identify three channels through which a higher e ￿ a⁄ects employment: the fea-
sible real wage, the target real wage and the worker-selection e⁄ect. However,
we postpone the discussion of these e⁄ects to section 4.2.
The aggregate unemployment rate u turns out to be
u = 1 ￿ ￿3￿3 ￿ e ￿
!￿￿k
: (30)
Next, we derive the level of welfare. We choose per capita output Y=L as
the measure of welfare. As pointed out by Melitz (2003), aggregate pro￿ts
are used to ￿nance the initial investments fe of ￿rms. Thus, only the wage
income is available for consumption. Due to the markup pricing rule, the per
capita wage income is then equal to a constant share ￿ of per capita output:
W=L = ￿Y=L. Using the technology assumption (2) and (22), the per capita
5To ensure 0 ￿ u ￿ 1, we have to assume ￿3 ￿ e ￿
!
￿ 1, that is, aggregate labor demand
H must not exceed the number of active workers L. The higher the shape parameter k, the
larger is the fraction of ￿rms with an entrepreneurial productivity close to the cut o⁄ level,
the larger is the fraction of ￿rms with a relatively low minimum quality requirement, and the
larger is the number of active workers. If k exceeds a well-de￿ned threshold, the condition
H < L is ful￿lled (for a similar problem and solution see Egger and Kreickemeier, 2009).
14output is Y=L = Mq(e ￿)=L = Mh(e ￿)a(e ￿;￿)e ￿=L = Ha(e ￿;￿)e ￿=(￿1￿2L). Now









Finally, we consider the distribution of wages in the general equilibrium.
Following Egger and Kreickemeier (2009), we choose the ratio of the average
wage rate, w, to the lowest wage rate, w(￿
￿); as measure of wage inequality. The
average wage rate is de￿ned by w ￿ W=H = ￿Y=H. Observing Y = Mq(e ￿),
(2), (22), and (24) yields w = w(e ￿)=￿1￿2. By combining (18) with (21) the
lowest wage can be computed as w(￿
￿) = w(e ￿)=￿1. Consequently, our measure








k ￿ ￿ + ￿!
k ￿ ￿
: (32)
If the minimum quality requirement does not depend on the entrepreneurial
productivity but is identical across all ￿rms (￿ = 0), we are back in the Melitz-
world of all ￿rms paying the same wage. There would be no wage inequality.
The same holds true, if the ability of the union￿ s median member does not
matter for his or her fallback income (! = 0).
We are now in a position to discuss the impact of an increase in the unions￿
bargaining power on the labor market variables and welfare. By virtue of (19)
and (21), ￿
￿ and e ￿ remaining constant, there is no shift in the minimum quality
requirement, no worker-selection e⁄ect, and no change in the segregation of the
labor force into active workers and long-term unemployed. Thus, L and Ll are
not a⁄ected. However, the wage markup ￿ goes up, that is, unions boost the
target real wage at any given level of employment. Firms respond to such an
increase in their marginal costs with a rise in the pro￿t-maximizing price. Prod-
uct and labor demand drop, and the unemployment rate of active workers rises.
Moreover, the increase in the wage markup ￿ implies a widening of the inter-
val of abilities. The lower bound remains constant, but the wage hike attracts
workers with higher abilities. For any ￿rm the ability of the e¢ cient worker
goes up, and so does average ability, the feasible real wage and employment.
Concerning employment, the former e⁄ect always dominates the latter e⁄ect, so
aggregate employment declines. Concerning output and welfare the decline in
employment and the increase in labor productivity work in opposite directions,
and so the sign of the net e⁄ect depends on the sign of ￿a;w (1 + !)￿ A+1
A . The
results are summarized in:
Proposition 1 Suppose that there is an increase in union bargaining power.
Then, (i) the segregation of the labor force into active workers and long-term
unemployed is not a⁄ected; (ii) the real wage increases, (iii) the employment
of active workers declines, and (iv) wage inequality remains constant. (v) For
￿a;w (1 + !) > A+1
A output and welfare increase, but for ￿a;w (1 + !) < A+1
A
output and welfare decrease.
15Proof. see text and Appendix D.
We complete our model by computing the number of ￿rms in the same way





The stability of the equilibrium turns out to be a crucial issue. In the
Melitz-model, marginal costs (the wage) are given to the ￿rm. A ￿rm with a
productivity lower than ￿
￿ does not sell enough to cover ￿xed costs, the ￿rm
does not enter the market. In our model, however, the wage and therefore
marginal costs are at the disposal of the ￿rm. The marginal ￿rm with ￿i = ￿
￿
may thus have an incentive to lower the wage and the price in order to attract
additional demand. By lowering the wage, the marginal ￿rm looses its most
e¢ cient workers, but the number of applicants does drop to zero. Workers
with ability a￿ ful￿ll the minimum quality requirement of the marginal ￿rm
and they are willing to work for any positive wage, since their only alternative
is long-term unemployment with zero utility. Similarly, a ￿rm with ￿i < ￿
￿
posts vacancies with wi < w(￿
￿) and still gets applicants. In such a scenario
long-term unemployment may vanish.
But we do not ￿nd this scenario very plausible. Our justi￿cation of the ex-
istence of long-term unemployment is twofold. First, long-term unemployment
is a matter of fact. Second, the incorporation of e¢ ciency wage considerations
would immediately provide a microeconomic rationale for a wage rigidity at
the wage w(￿
￿). Suppose the technology (2) is extended by an e⁄ort function:
qi = hi￿iaiei with e⁄ort ei = ei( wi
w(￿￿)). Workers evaluate a ￿rm￿ s wage o⁄er
by comparison with w(￿
￿) as wage reference. For wi > w(￿
￿) worker increase
e⁄ort, for wi < w(￿
￿) worker decrease e⁄ort compared to a reference level,
which we normalize to one. Most important, at least from our point of view,
is the growing empirical evidence that the response to wage changes is highly
asymmetric. As the literature on reciprocity in labor relations indicates, wage
increases have a weak e⁄ect, while wage cuts led to a strong decline in e⁄ort
(see, e.g., Chemin et al., 2011; Cohn et al., 2011; Kube et al., 2010; Danthine
and Kurman, 2007). We put this observation to the extreme by assuming that
a wage wi higher than w(￿
￿) has no impact on e⁄ort, ei remains constant at
unity. By contrast, a decline in the wage below the reference level leads to a
strong decline in e⁄ort. To be more precise, we assume that the wage elasticity
of the e⁄ort function is (at least) one. In this case, the marginal ￿rm with
￿i = ￿
￿ and wi = w(￿
￿) does not have an incentive to lower the wage. Due to
the decline in e⁄ort, there will be no decline in marginal costs.
No doubt, extending the model by incorporating e¢ ciency wages has a value
added. But balancing the value added with the loss of analytical tractability we
decided to postpone this issue to further research.
164 Open economy
4.1 Modi￿cations
We now turn to an open economy setting with two symmetric countries.6 Two
types of trade costs are distinguished: (i) ￿xed per period costs fx ￿ 0, measured
in units of ￿nal output, and (ii) variable iceberg costs ￿ > 1. If the partitioning
assumption fx￿￿￿1 > f holds, only a fraction of ￿rms engages in exporting. In
the open economy setting, M now denotes the number of ￿rms located in each
country. Let Mx be the number of exporters in each country. Then, the total
number of all active ￿rms and thus the number of all available varieties in a
country is Mt = M + Mx.
The export variables can be expressed as a function of the domestic variables
(see Melitz, 2003): pix = ￿pi, qix = ￿￿￿qi, hix = ￿1￿￿hi and rix = ￿1￿￿ri. The
pro￿t-maximizing price as well as the output, employment, revenue and pro￿t of
exporters are determined by the equations in section 2. The decision to export
or not depends on the entrepreneurial productivity. Firms will export if and
only if the pro￿ts from exporting are non-negative: ￿x ￿ 0. There is a critical
export productivity cut-o⁄, de￿ned by ￿x (￿
￿
x) = 0, where a ￿rm just breaks
even in the export market. For ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
x, ￿rms are exporters and produce for
both the home and foreign markets. For ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ < ￿
￿
x, ￿rms produce for the
home market only. The ex ante probability of being an exporter is given by
￿ =
1 ￿ G￿ (￿
￿
x)











With these modi￿cations at hand we are able to compute the weighted av-
erage productivity of all active ￿rms in a country, e ￿t. In line with Egger and
Kreickemeier (2009), we obtain:















where e ￿ is the average productivity of all domestic ￿rms and e ￿x is the aver-
age productivity of exporting ￿rms. Owing to the Pareto distribution, these
















To simplify the analysis we assume that the per period domestic ￿xed costs f
are equal to the per period foreign ￿xed costs fx. In this case, the ￿lost in
6We abstract from di⁄erences in country size, technologies etc. See P￿￿ger and Russek
(2010) for a treatment of these asymmetries.
17transit￿and the ￿export selection￿e⁄ects exactly o⁄set each other, the average
productivity of domestic ￿rms, e ￿, is equal to the average productivity of all
￿rms active in a country, e ￿t (see Egger and Kreickemeier, 2009). Formally, we














Substituting (36) into (33) leads to e ￿t = e ￿. Furthermore, (36) implies ￿ =
￿￿k=(1+￿￿￿!), namely that the probability of being an exporter is decreasing in
the iceberg costs.
The aggregate variables, which again can be interpreted as product market
clearing conditions, are derived in the standard way with the underlying as-
sumption of an equalized balance of payments. It follows: P = p(e ￿t) ￿ 1, Y =
Mtq(e ￿t), R = Mtr(e ￿t) and ￿ = Mt￿(e ￿t). Moreover, note that Mt = M (1 + ￿).
For the employment level, we get:
H = h(e ￿t)￿1￿2 1; (37)




￿! = M + Mx￿￿￿!=(1+￿￿￿!). For a given level of
e ￿t, aggregate employment is increasing in the number of ￿rms and decreasing
in the iceberg costs. In particular, the employment of exporters is a negative
function of ￿.
We complete our model by the derivation of the general equilibrium in the
open economy. In doing so, we calculate the feasible real wage and the target
real wage in analogy to the autarky case and obtain:










(1 ￿ u) ￿ e ￿
￿!
t : (39)
The unemployment rate of active workers u, the number of active workers L,
the number of employed active workers H, the number of long-term unemployed
Ll; and the aggregate unemployment rate of the labor force u can be computed
as:
u = 1 ￿ ￿3 ￿ e ￿
!
t (40)
L = ￿3 ￿ e ￿
￿￿k
t ￿ L (41)
H = ￿3 ￿ e ￿
1￿(1￿!)￿￿k
t ￿ L (42)
Ll =
￿





18u = 1 ￿ ￿3￿3 ￿ e ￿
!￿￿k
t : (44)





Observing the de￿nition of  1 as well as (42) and a = ￿1￿2e ￿
￿
from (C2) in Ap-
pendix C, we get:
Y
L









1 + ￿(￿!+k)=k > 1: (46)





=  2 ￿
k ￿ ￿ + ￿!
k ￿ ￿
: (47)








4.2 Autarky versus trade ￿macroeconomic implications
The transition from autarky to trade causes the well-known ￿rm-selection e⁄ect
(see Melitz, 2003), which occurs because of an increase in the cut-o⁄productivity
￿
￿. The market opening increases the number of available product varieties,
which implies a reduction in the demand for any individual ￿rm. The degree
of competitiveness in the home market increases, and the least productive ￿rms
exit. Firms that produce solely for the domestic market incur a pro￿t decline
because of the reduction in demand. Exporters gain from the foreign market,
but only the most productive ￿rms make up for their loss of domestic sales
and the per period ￿xed costs fx, and increase their pro￿ts. Observing (19),
(21), (35), (48), and e ￿t = e ￿, we conclude that there is an increasing average









= (1 + ￿)
1=k > 1; (49)
where the index a denotes the autarky situation.
We now turn to the implications of trade openness for the labor market to
shed some light on the unemployment-trade relationship. Namely, our focus will
be on the impact of trade on the (un-)employment of low-skilled and high-skilled
workers.
Let us start with the segregation of workers into long-term unemployed and
active workers. By comparing (27) with (43) and (28) with (41), we observe
19a shift towards long-term unemployment, i.e. the number of long-term un-
employed Ll unambiguously increases, whereas the number of active workers L
unambiguously decreases. The increase in the cut-o⁄productivity leads to a rise
in workers￿minimum quality requirement, and thus the least e¢ cient workers
are driven out of the market and switch to long-term unemployment (worker-
selection e⁄ect). As mentioned above, the higher k and/or ￿, the stronger is
the worker-selection e⁄ect.
The worker-selection e⁄ect also reduces employment H (see Eq.(41)). But
there are two additional e⁄ects. The increase in average productivity e ￿t re-
duces the marginal costs of the representative ￿rm, shifting up the feasible real
wage and labor demand. The employment of active workers increases one-to-
one. This e⁄ect, however, is mitigated by an increase in the target real wage.
According to (3), the representative ￿rm increases its minimum quality require-
ment, while the union focuses on a median member with higher abilities than
before and bargains for a higher wage. The increase in the target real wage will
be reinforced by the improvement in macroeconomic performance. The outside
wage of the median member increases (see (13)), and due to a higher fallback
income the union enhances its wage claim. If the weight of the macroeconomic
component of the outside wage is large (low !, high 1 ￿ !), unions respond to
the increase in the feasible real wage with a nearly proportional increase in the
target real wage. For ! = 0, the combined e⁄ect on the feasible and the target
real wage cancels out with respect to employment. The overall employment
e⁄ect of higher entrepreneurial productivity collapses to the worker-selection
e⁄ect, see (42). For 0 < ! < ￿k, the rise in the feasible real wage is larger than
the rise in the target real wage, but the positive impact on employment does
not compensate for the worker-selection e⁄ect. The net-e⁄ect of trade openness
on employment is negative. A necessary (and su¢ cient) condition for a positive
overall employment e⁄ect of trade openness is ! > ￿k.
Concerning the unemployment rate of active workers, u = 1 ￿ H=L, the
result is clear-cut: u declines, see (40). The pool of workers that ful￿ll the
minimum ability requirement diminishes (lower L). Depending on the parameter
constellation, there may be a decline in employment H, too, but the decline in
H is always lower than is the decline in L. Consequently, the unemployment
rate u unambiguously decreases.
A decline in the unemployment rate of active workers is not equivalent to a
decline in the rate of aggregate unemployment u. The reason is clear: due to the
worker-selection e⁄ect, some active workers switch to long-term unemployment
(u declines but u rises). As indicated by (44), the condition for the change in
u is identical to the condition for the change in H. Since, by assumption, only
active workers can be employed, an increase in H must go hand in hand with a
decline in u, vice versa. To be more precise, for ! > ￿k employment H rises
(u declines), whereas for ! < ￿k employment declines (u rises). We summarize
all these results in:
Proposition 2 Suppose that an economy switches from autarky to trade. Then,
higher average entrepreneurial productivity e ￿t leads to (i) a higher number of
20long-term unemployed, (ii) a lower number of active workers, and (iii) a decline
in the unemployment rate of active workers. (iv) For ! < ￿k, the negative
worker-selection e⁄ect exceeds the rise in the feasible real wage, aggregate em-
ployment of active workers declines, and the rate of aggregate unemployment
goes up. (v) For ! > ￿k, the positive impact of a higher feasible wage outweighs
the worker-selection e⁄ect, thus, the aggregate employment of active workers
increases and the rate of aggregate unemployment goes down.
Proof. see text
Next, we consider the trade-welfare relationship, where welfare is proxied by
per capita output. Welfare is a⁄ected through di⁄erent channels that may work
in opposite directions. The sign of the net e⁄ect is parameter-dependent.
These channels are the increase in active workers, the worker-selection e⁄ect,
the rise in both entrepreneurial productivity and workers￿average abilities, and,
￿nally, the composition e⁄ect of the surviving ￿rms.
Proposition 3 (i) The condition  2(1 + ￿)(1+￿+!￿￿k)=k > 1 is necessary and
su¢ cient for a positive welfare e⁄ect of trade openness. (ii) For a mild worker-
selection e⁄ect, ￿k < 1 + ￿ + !, the welfare e⁄ect is unambiguously positive;
and (iii) for a strong worker-selection e⁄ect, ￿k > 1+￿+!, welfare may even
decline.
Proof. Noting e ￿t=e ￿a = (1 + ￿)
1=k > 1 from (49), the ratio of welfare in the
open-economy setting (45) and welfare in autarky (31) is greater than unity, if
and only if  2(1+￿)(1+￿+!￿￿k)=k > 1 holds. Since we have  2 > 1 (see (46)),
the condition is ful￿lled for ￿k < 1 + ￿ + !. For ￿k > 1 + ￿ + !, the term
(1 + ￿)(1+￿+!￿￿k)=k is lower than unity, which is necessary but not su¢ cient
for a negative welfare e⁄ect of trade openness.
If the worker-selection e⁄ect is weak, trade openness has a positive impact
on aggregate employment and thus on output and welfare. Only if trade openess
reduces aggregate employment, ￿k > !, does the welfare e⁄ect becomes more
complex. Owing to the technology assumption (2), the increase in entrepre-
neurial productivity directly raises output one to one. In addition, the switch
of the least e¢ cient workers to long-term unemployment causes an increase in
the average abilities of the active workers. This raises output by the factor ￿.
If these two positive e⁄ects on output exceed the negative employment e⁄ect,
1+￿ > ￿k￿!, welfare improves (part (ii) of Proposition 4). The welfare e⁄ect
of trade openness turns negative, if the worker-selection e⁄ect compensates for
both the output e⁄ects just described and the composition e⁄ect of the surviv-
ing ￿rms. Only the more productive ￿rms survive under openness; the most
productive ￿rms are able to export and become even bigger, which increases
output per capita and welfare. This e⁄ect is captured in  2 > 1.
In the last step, we turn to the e⁄ects on wage distribution. From (32)
and (47), it follows that the wage di⁄erential w=w(￿
￿) widens. The rise in the
average wage rate exceeds the rise in the wage paid by the least productive
active ￿rm. This result coincides with Egger and Kreickemeier (2009).
215 Trade liberalization
In order to model the impact of economic integration, the switch from autarky
to trade is a popular but polar case. A di⁄erent modeling approach is the
assumption of a decline in iceberg costs, that is, a decline in trade barriers
between countries, that already trade with each other. These scenarios are
similar, but not identical. In this section we will point out that, in particular,
the welfare e⁄ect of trade liberalization and the impact on wage distribution
may di⁄er.
Let us start with the labor market. We know from (36) that the probability
of being an exporter is decreasing in the iceberg costs, ￿ = ￿￿k=(1+￿￿￿!). A
lower ￿ leads to a larger fraction of exporters. Moreover, due to a higher degree
of competition, the domestic cut-o⁄ productivity ￿
￿ increases, see (48). This
translates into an increase in the average productivities e ￿ and e ￿t. For the
employment e⁄ects, we thus get the same results as in the case of a switch from
autarky to trade.
Proposition 4 The employment e⁄ects of a decline in iceberg costs are equiva-
lent to the employment e⁄ects of a switch from autarky to trade. Speci￿cally, (i)
for a weak worker-selection e⁄ect, ak < !, aggregate employment improves, and
(ii) for a strong worker-selection e⁄ect, ak > !, aggregate employment declines.
Proof. See Proposition 3 and note that @￿
￿=@￿ < 0:
The theoretical results are in line with the empirical literature. First, there is
strong evidence for the increasing demand for high-skilled workers due to trade
liberalization. Take, for instance, Verhoogen (2008), who shows for the Mexi-
can manufacturing sector that only the most productive ￿rms became exporters
by producing high-quality commodities. These ￿rms demand more high-skilled
workers that conform to these high technology requirements. Similarly, for
the US industry Bernard and Jensen (1997) ￿nd that exporters boost their
high-skilled labor demand. Second, there is much empirical evidence for a pos-
itive correlation between trade openness and the unemployment of low-skilled
workers. Biscourp and Kramarz (2007) use the French Customs ￿les to show
that increasing imports lead to job destruction, in particular production jobs.
Moreover, job destruction is signi￿cantly higher for larger ￿rms. Bazen and
Cardebat (2001) ￿nd that the decline in import prices in France between 1985
and 1992 caused a reduction in low-skilled employment. Finally, Wood (1995)
￿nds empirical support for the hypothesis that the deteriorating situation of
low-skilled workers in developed countries can be tracked back to trade with
developing countries. Third, to the best of our knowledge, there is no clear
empirical evidence for the sign of the relationship between trade and the ag-
gregate unemployment rate. Tre￿er (2004) analyses the e⁄ects of the North
American Free Trade Agreement. He ￿nds evidence for the ￿rm-selection e⁄ect,
which increases productivity, but lowers employment. This is in contrast to, for
instance, Dutt et al. (2009) and Felbermayr et al. (2011), who ￿nd that trade
either reduces unemployment or has no e⁄ect on it.
22We now turn to the welfare e⁄ects of trade liberalization. Di⁄erentiating
















The ￿rst summand in the square brackets replicates the trade openness scenario.
A reduction in iceberg costs increases the cut-o⁄ and average productivity, ￿
￿
and e ￿t, respectively. Noting @e ￿t=@￿ < 0, the ￿rst summand is negative if the
worker-selection e⁄ect is weak, that is, if 1 + ￿ + ! ￿ ￿k > 0. Then, trade
liberalization enhances welfare. For a strong worker-selection e⁄ect, 1 + ￿ +
! ￿ ￿k < 0, the ￿rst summand turns into positive and welfare declines, ceteris
paribus (see Proposition 3).
But in the case of trade liberalization we observe an additional e⁄ect, re-
￿ ected in the second summand in the square brackets of (50). The composition
of ￿rms changes by virtue of  2. On the one hand, the export cut-o⁄ falls and
consequently more ￿rms engage in the foreign market, which increases their
pro￿ts ￿and welfare shifts up (higher  2). On the other hand, the productivity
cut-o⁄ increases, which forces the least productive ￿rms out of the market and
welfare decreases (lower  2). Formally, we can use ￿ = ￿k=(￿(!￿1)￿1) and (36)




















We get @ 2=@￿ < 0 if ￿ < ￿, and @ 2=@￿ > 0 if ￿ > ￿. The following
proposition summarizes the welfare e⁄ect:
Proposition 5 (i) If the worker-selection e⁄ect is weak and iceberg costs are
low, 1+￿+! ￿￿k > 0 and ￿ < ￿, trade liberalization increases welfare. (ii) If
the worker-selection e⁄ect is strong and iceberg costs are high, 1+￿+!￿￿k < 0
and ￿ > ￿, trade liberalization lowers welfare. (iii) In all other cases the welfare
e⁄ect is ambiguous.
Finally, we use (47) to analyze the e⁄ect of trade liberalization on wage
distribution. A reduction of ￿ implies a decrease in the export productivity cut-
o⁄, shifting up the number of exporting ￿rms that pay relatively higher wages.
Wage inequality thus increases (higher  2). But trade liberalization also implies
a higher degree of competitiveness; the cut-o⁄productivity and the lowest wage
rate increase. Ceteris paribus, wage inequality decreases (lower  2). Combining
these e⁄ects, we ￿nd (see Egger and Kreickemeier, 2009, for a similar result):
Proposition 6 (i) If iceberg costs are low, ￿ < ￿, trade liberalization increases
wage inequality, whereas, (ii) if iceberg costs are high, ￿ > ￿, trade liberalization
reduces wage inequality.
23The predictions of our model concerning employment and welfare very much
depend on the parameters !, ￿ and k. What are the most plausible parameter
values? The strength of the worker-selection e⁄ect is most sensitive to the
shape parameter k of the Pareto distribution. Conducting a general equilibrium
simulation of trade policy, Balistreri et al. (2011) estimate a value of k = 5:2,
but the authors immediately admit that this number seems to be somewhat
high. The calibration exercise of Bernard et al. (2007) assumes k = 3:4, the
estimates in Eaton et al. (2004) imply k = 4:2, while Corcos et al. (2009)
￿nd a value of k close to 2. The parameter !, measuring the weight of the
abilities in the wage determination, has been estimated only in a few studies.
Keane (1993) claims that 84 percent of wage di⁄erences across industries are
explained by individual ￿xed e⁄ects, while only 16 percent can be traced back
to industry dummies. The strong weight of individual characteristics in the
wage determination is con￿rmed by, for instance, Fairris and Jonasson (2008)
and Holmlund and Zetterberg (1991). Hence, a value of ! = 0:8 does not
seem at odds with the empirical literature. Unfortunately, to the best of our
knowledge, there is no empirical estimation for the parameter ￿, which captures
the strength of the minimum quality requirements. Intuitively, ￿ should be close
to but smaller than 1. Given these parameter speci￿cations, the case ! < ￿k is
most likely. Our model thus predicts an increase in aggregate unemployment.
The welfare e⁄ect is more di¢ cult to sign, since even for the most plausible
parameter values 1+￿+! may exceed or fall short of ￿k. Note, however, that
our model does not allow for a love of variety e⁄ect and thus underestimates
the welfare e⁄ect.
6 Conclusion
This paper investigates the labor market e⁄ects of trade liberalization. We in-
corporate trade unions and heterogeneous workers into the Melitz (2003) frame-
work. Workers di⁄er with respect to their abilities. It is shown that the em-
ployment e⁄ect of trade liberalization is ability-speci￿c. The central mechanism
underlying our results is the worker-selection e⁄ect, which in turn is based on the
most plausible assumption that ￿rms with a high entrepreneurial productivity
demand workers with a high (minimum) ability. Since trade liberalization raises
the cut-o⁄ entrepreneurial productivity, trade liberalization also leads to a rise
in workers￿minimum quality requirement and thus the least e¢ cient workers
are driven out of the market and switch to long-term unemployment. For work-
ers with abilities lower than the increased minimum requirement employment
decreases (to zero). By contrast, for workers with high abilities employment
increases. The change in aggregate employment is ambiguous. If a country is
endowed with a large fraction of low-skilled workers, trade liberalization leads
to a decline in aggregate employment. In this case, trade liberalization may
even harm a country￿ s welfare.
Last but not least let us mention some limitations of our framework. Most
crucial, from our point of view, is the assumption that the shape parameter of
24the Pareto-distribution of the entrepreneurial productivities is identical to the
shape parameter of the Pareto-distribution of workers￿abilities. It is most plau-
sible that di⁄erent shape parameters would modify the conditions for the sign of
the employment and welfare e⁄ect. We leave this problem for further research.
A more fundamental criticism is concerned with the lack of a ￿ ow equilibrium
between (long-term) unemployment and employment. Once a worker falls short
of the minimum ability requirement, he or she switches to long-term unemploy-
ment and there is no opportunity to switch back into employment. There are
two ways out of this problem, either assume a search-theoretic labor market
or endogenize the decision to invest in human capital in order to explain the




Derivation of the average ability (4):
We modify the density function ga (a) because of a￿ > amin and obtain


















However, ￿rm i demands only abilities that lie within the interval a￿
i and azi.












i ￿ a ￿ azi: (A1)
Next, we compute the expected value of (A1), which immediately leads to Eq.
(4) in the text.
Derivation of the ability of the median member (16):
To obtain the median of the ability interval (a￿
i, azi), we ￿rst calculate the













Next, we convert Z (a) into the quantile function, which equals the inverse of
Z (a). The median ami is de￿ned as the 0:5 quantile, ami = Z￿1 (0:5), which
leads to Eq. (16) in the text.
Appendix B
Derivation of the wage elasticity of average ability





we get @azi=@wi =






￿ai;wi = ￿ai;azi=! with ￿ai;azi ￿ @ai
@azi
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Next, insert the minimum ability (3) and the ability of the e¢ cient worker (17)






















Observing ￿ai;wi = ￿ai;azi=! and the wage markup (9), we yield a single equa-
tion determining the elasticity ￿ai;wi. Since all ￿rms face the same structural
parameters and since the entrepreneurial productivity does not enter into (B2),
the wage elasticity of average ability and thus the wage markup is identical
across all ￿rms: ￿ai;wi = ￿a;w and ￿i = ￿ or all i. Due to non-linearities we can
not derive a closed form solution for ￿a;w. Simulations, however, indicate that
for all meaningful (but not for all) parameter constellations the elasticity does
not exceed one. In the following we thus assume ￿a;w ￿ 1. This assumption
rules out a scenario where a wage hike leads to a decline in marginal costs and
thus a decline in the pro￿t-maximizing price.
Appendix C
Derivation of the unemployment rate of the active workers (26):
Combine (24) and (25) to eliminate the wage. This leads to
￿ae ￿ = A1=k(1 ￿ u)1=! ￿ e ￿
￿
with A ￿ 2￿
k=! ￿ 1 > 1: (C1)
Inserting the minimum quality requirement (3), the upper bound of abilities
(17) and ￿i = e ￿ into the average ability (4) yields :






Substitute (C2) into (C1) and rearrange for the unemployment rate of active
workers:









Proof of part (iii) of Proposition 1
We compute the relation between unions￿bargaining power and the employ-
ment level of active workers. Remember that an increase in ￿ raises the wage-
markup ￿ and shifts up the wage rate, which in turn increases the average abil-






￿2 < 1 and (29) follows sign@H
@￿ = sign@￿3
@￿ .


























































































Noting that 0 < ! ￿ 1, ￿a;w < 1; and @￿=@￿ > 0, we obtain @H=@￿ < 0.
Proof of part (v) of Proposition 1
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